are to coexist on the same computer system. In this paper we show that a combined virtual machine monitor/operating system (VMM/OS) approach to Information system isolation provides substantially better software security than a conventlonal multiprogrammlng operating system approach.
Thls added protection is derived from redundant security using Independent mechanisms that are Inherent In the deslgn of most VMM/OS systems. In this paper we show that the Vlrtua] Machine approach provides effective solutions to these problems. 
t t e m p t to d e t e c t t h i s
kind o f e r r o r but t h e r e are many o t h e r sabotage techniques and complete s e c u r l t y is u n l l k e l y .
R e f e r r i n g back to F i g u r e 3(a) we can see some o f the f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g to the problem.
In o r d e r to p r o v i d e s u f f l c l e n t f u n c t l o n a l l t y to be e f f e c t i v e f o r a l a r g e and heterogeneous I c o l l e c t i o n o f user programs, the o p e r a t i n g system must be q u i t e comprehensive and, thus, more v u l n e r a b l e to e r r o r .
In g e n e r a l , a s i n g l e l o g i c a l e r r o r In the o p e r a t i n g system s o f t w a r e can i n v a l i d a t e the e n t i r e s e c u r i t y mechanism.
F u r t h e r m o r e , as d e p i c t e d In F i g u r e 3 ( a ) , t h e r e Is no more p r o t e c t i o n between the
programs o f d i f f e r i n g user groups or the o p e r a t i n g system than t h e r e is between the a p p l i c a t i o n programs of a s i n g l e user group. virtual machine monitors tend to be shorter, simpler, and easier to debug than conventional multlprogrammlng operating systems, even when k=m, the VHM Is less error-prone. For example, since the VMM Is defined by the hardware specifications of the real machine, the field engineer's hardware diagnostic software can be used to checkout the correctness of the VMM.
We can deflne the probabllity of machlne vlolating the security of another concurrent another virtual machlne as:
Based on the Inequalities of A and B above and the multlpllcative dependency in C, we arrive at the conclusion:
Ps(PIOS(n)IVNM(k)) << Ps(PIOS(m)) for n,k<m there Is a consistency check performed on the decision using Independent hardware and software" (Fabry(2)). Table 1 Illustrates redundant security mechanisms possible in a VMM/OS e n v i r o n m e n t u s l n g VM/370 and 0S/360 as example f o r memory s e c u r i t y a r e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t s i n c e the mechanisms t h a t a r e used are so d i f f e r e n t .
h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e y w o u l d b o t h be s u s c e p t l b l e p e n e t r a t i o n t e c h n l q u e s . 
